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The Technological Expert
in Products Liability Litigationt
William A. Donaher,* Henry R. Piehler,**
Aaron D. Twerski,*** and Alvin S. Weinstein****
The technical expert performs a vital role in negligence actions.
He is uniquely qualified to extract from complex facts the opinions and
conclusions that will aid the jury in its determinations. In strict prod-
ucts liability litigation the role of the technologist is pivotal. Beyond
the traditional function of distilling technological data, the technical
expert in products liability actions bears an expanded responsibility
arising from the necessity of addressing questions of major societal
significance."
I. Strict Liability and the Unreasonably Dangerous Product
In strict products liability the fundamental issue centers on the ef-
ficacy of the product in the environment of its use.' Yet the case law
discloses much confusion concerning the manner in which the strict lia-
bility standard should be formulated in order to reflect this concept.
The earliest expression of this idea is found in § 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, which predicates liability upon a finding that
t This article originated in an ongoing research project entitled "Product Liabil-
ity: An Interaction of Law and Technology." The entire study was financed by a
grant, GI-34857, from the National Science Foundation within its program of Research
Applied to National Needs (RANN).
* Professor of Law, Duquesne University. A.B. 1949, Catholic University of
America; LL.B. 1952, Harvard University.
** Associate Professor of Metallurgy, Materials Science, and Public Affairs, Car-
negie-Mellon University. S.B. 1960, S.M. 1962, Se. D. 1967, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
*** Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Hofstra University. A.B. 1962, Beth
Medrash Elyon Research Institute; B.S. 1970, University of Wisconsin; J.D. 1965,
Marquette University.
**** Professor of Mechanical Engineering and Public Affairs, Carnegie-Mellon Uni-
versity. B.S. 1951, University of Michigan; M.S. 1953, Ph.D. 1955, Carnegie Institute
of Technology.
1. For an analysis of the products liability process and the role of the expert wit-
ness, see Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, Product Liability: An Interaction of
Law and Technology, 12 DuQ. L. Rav. 425 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Weinstein].
2. Id. at 442.
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a product is "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer. ' 3  The comments following this section provide
that a product is defective when "it is . . .in a condition not contem-
plated by the ultimate consumer," 4 and describe unreasonably danger-
ous as "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contem-
plated by the ordinary consumer who purchases [the product], with
the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its character-
istics." 5 This formulation focuses on the product as a functioning en-
tity in the hands of the consumer; it is totally removed from the negli-
gence approach, which emphasizes the manufacturer's conduct.
The Restatement standard is, however, a mixed blessing. Al-
though it forces an examination of the actual environment of product
use, it suffers from the fact that this examination is undertaken from
the viewpoint of the ordinary consumer. The test suggests that if the
ordinary consumer "contemplates" the danger, then the product is not
unreasonably dangerous. Indeed, there is a strong argument that the
Restatement language is but an updated version of the patent danger
rule. This rule, which has come under heavy attack from both aca-
demic6 and judicial quarters, 7 provides that a manufacturer has ful-
filled all his duties to the consumer if the product's dangers are open
and obvious. In many instances manufacturers have been absolved
from liability when an obvious danger caused serious injury, even
though that injury could have been averted by a design modification
that would not have added significantly to the cost of the product or
impaired its usefulness." For courts seeking to rid themselves of ev-
ery vestige of the patent danger rule, the adoption of the § 402A com-
ments was fraught with risks. The language could too easily be mis-
understood.
The California Supreme Court recently evidenced its unwillingness
to permit this uncertainty to upset the very real gains made in strict lia-
3. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
4. Id. comment g.
5. Id. comment i.
6. See 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIAnBILIY §§ 6.04, 7.02, 8.04
(1973); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TbE LAW OF TORTS § 28.5 (1956).
7. See Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 759-60 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd sub
nom. Yoder Co. v. General Copper & Brass Co., 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973); Pike
v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 473-74, 467 P.2d 229, 234-35, 85 Cal. Rptr.
629, 634-35 (1970); Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 508, 516, 476 P.2d
713, 719 (1970).
8. See Patten v. Logemann Bros. Co., 263 Md. 364, 283 A.2d 567 (1971); Bolm
v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973); Campo
v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950). See also Twerski, From Codling,
to Bolm to Velez: Triptych of Confusion, 2 HOFS'RA L. Rnv. 489 (1974).
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bility theory. In Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.9 the product under con-
sideration was a hasp that failed to hold bakery trays in place when a
bakery truck collided with another vehicle. There was evidence that
one hasp was constructed of defective metal and thus gave way on im-
pact, permitting the trays to come forward and strike the driver's back.
The trial court instructed the jurors that they were to find for plaintiff
if the hasp was defective and proximately caused the injury. De-
fendant argued that plaintiff should be required to prove that the
hasp was unreasonably dangerous as well. The California court, how-
ever, reasoned that the "unreasonably dangerous" language of § 402A
and the accompanying commentary "ring of negligence' and might
deny a legitimate plaintiff a rightful cause of action: "[I]f, in the
view of the trier of fact, the 'ordinary consumer' would have expected
the defective condition of a product, the seller is not strictly liable re-
gardless of the expectations of the injured plaintiff."'" The court ac-
knowledged that some standard of defectiveness is needed,': but it re-
jected unreasonable danger, apparently believing that the Restatement
definition focuses too heavily on the ordinary consumer's expectation
rather than on the product's defectiveness.'"
A cynic might suggest that it was not necessary to throw out the
baby with the bath water. The court could have disavowed the Re-
statement comments as misleading and established the rule that a prod-
uct must be unreasonably dangerous, not as defined from the perspec-
tive of the ordinary consumer, but rather from the perspective of so-
ciety making the ultimate judgment by balancing risk and utility.' 3
9. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
10. Id. at 132-33, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
11. Id. at 134 n.16, 501 P.2d at 1162 n.16, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442 n.16.
12. For a somewhat different view of the Cronin court's motivation, see Wade, On
the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 839 (1973), suggest-
ing that the court repudiated the Restatement formulation because the unreasonably dan-
gerous standard implied a requirement of special or unusual danger. If Dean Wade is
correct, the court should have substituted a different standard to supplant the misleading
"unreasonably dangerous" formula. In fact, the court made no effort to enunciate a
standard for the defect concept, merely suggesting that there are "useful precedents." 8
Cal. 3d at 134 n.16, 501 P.2d at 1162 n.16, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442 n.16. It has drawn
sharp criticism for this lapse. See Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect,
5 ST. MAnY's L.. 30, 30-32 (1973).
13. In a companion case decided the same day, Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136,
501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972), the court emphasized that a products liability
plaintiff need not prove that he was unaware of the defect at the time of the accident.
Luque and Cronin together indicate that a product can be declared defectilre separate
and apart from recognition by consumers and manufacturers of its potential dangers. If
the danger recognition issue is to surface at all, it must be within the affirmative defense
of assumption of the risk. Within the context of the Luque case, the court did not find
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The net effect of the court's failure to adopt this rule is that the concept
of defect in California now lacks meaningful content,14 and it may now
be true that defect, like obscenity in Justice Stewart's definition, will be
discovered by sense impression. Unfortunately, "I know it when I see
it'"'5 will not suffice as a judicial standard for products liability.
A second formulation of the strict liability standard recently found
expression in Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp.,16 which involved al-
legedly inadequate safety guards on a power lawn mower. The court
instructed the jury: "[A] condition is unreasonably dangerous so as to
constitute a defective condition when it is so dangerous that a reason-
able man would not sell the product if he knew of the risks involved." 7
This reasonable seller test also suffers from vagueness. Properly under-
stood, the test does capture the essence of strict liability since the ques-
tion is not whether a reasonable seller should have known of the risks
but whether he would have sold the product if he had known.' s  The
court and jury, acting as the reasonable seller's conscience, will deter-
mine whether the product belongs in the marketplace. Nevertheless, if
the concern is possible misinterpretation of the strict liability standard,
the reasonable-seller test may be too heavily defense oriented, and this
test, too, has negligence overtones. To inquire -whether a reasonable
seller would have marketed the product if he had known of the risks
shifts the focus to the vantage point of the seller, whose evaluation of
it necessary to consider the obviousness of the danger as one of the factors bearing on
whether the product was defective. See text accompanying notes 21-28 infra.
14. See Culpepper v. Volkswagen of America Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 510, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 110 (1973); cf. Holford, The Limits of Strict Liability for Product Design and
Manufacture, 52 TExAs L. REv. 81, 94 (1973). The court in Culpepper, a design defect
case, was at a loss in attempting to evaluate the defect because there were no criteria
readily available. Thus, the impact of Cronin was clearly felt.
15. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, I., concurring).
16. 481 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1973).
17. Id. at 253.
18. This test originated in Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "De-fect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRA. L. REV. 559 (1969).
Dean Keeton suggested that
[A] product ought to be regarded as "unreasonably dangerous" at the time
of sale if a reasonable man with knowledge of the product's condition, and
an appreciation of all the risks found to exist by the jury at the time of trial,
would not now market the product, or, if he did market it, would at least
market it pursuant to a different set of warnings and instructions as to its
use. . . . Since the test is not one of negligence, it is not based upon the
risks and dangers that the maker should have, in the exercise of ordinary care,
known about. It is, rather, danger in fact, as that danger is found to be at
the time of the trial that controls.
Id. at 568 (emphasis added). For an even more extreme expression of the Keeton the-
sis, see Keeton, Product Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 ToXus L. REv. 398,
407-09 (1970).
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risk versus utility may understandably be skewed to his own perspec-
tive.
It is time to abandon the perspective of the reasonable consumer
and the reasonable seller and formulate the strict liability question for
what it is. The issue in every products case is whether the product qua
product meets society's standards of acceptability. The unreasonable
danger question, then, is posed in terms of whether, given the risks and
benefits of and possible alternatives to the product, we as a society will
live with it in its existing state or will require an altered, less danger-
ous form. 9 Stated succinctly, the question is whether the product is
a reasonable one given the reality of its use in contemporary society.
In order to develop the issue of unreasonably dangerous defect
within this formulation, it becomes crucial to understand the prod-
uct's technical inadequacies as they relate to societal expectations.
This approach requires no substantial departure from accepted legal
criteria.2" Dean Wade has suggested the following risk-utility consid-
erations for determining the acceptability of a product:2 1
(1) the usefulness and desirability of the product,2 (2) the
availability of other, safer products to meet the same need,28
19. The Eighth Circuit recently articulated these considerations in discussing the role
of the expert in a design defect case:
An expert witness is called primarily to aid the trier of fact in under-
standing evidence which is of a highly technical nature. His testimony is ap-
propriate when his unusual knowledge, by reason of skill, experience or edu-
cation may lend meaningful insights and better comprehension of technical
evidence. Here plaintiff's theory was based on dangerous design of a highly
complicated piece of machinery. Liability alleged from defective design en-
compasses many factors not generally relevant to ordinary negligence in tort
cases. The comparative design with similar and competitive machinery in the
field, alternate designs and post accident modification of the machine, the fre-
quency or infrequency of use of the same product with or without mishap, and
the relative cost and feasibility in adopting other design are all relevant to
proof of defective design.
Hoppe v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 485 F.2d 1196, 1202 (8th Cir. 1973) (footnotes
omitted).
20. A vast repository of judicial authority supports the conclusion that a risk-utility
balancing approach must be undertaken. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods.
Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973); Rivera v. Rockford Mach. & Tool Co., 1 111. App.
3d 641, 274 N.E.2d 828 (1971); Metal Window Prods. Co. v. Magnusen, 485 S.W.2d
355 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
21. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.. 5, 17 (1965) (foot-
notes added); see Wade, supra note 12, at 837-38.
22. See Hoppe v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 485 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1973); E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Stickney, 274 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Cochran
v. Brooke, 243 Ore. 89, 409 P.2d 904 (1966).
23. Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 IIl. App. 3d 313, 281 N.E.2d 749
(1972); see Walker v. Trico Mfg. Co., 487 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 978 (1974); Culpepper v. Volkswagen of America Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 510, 109
Cal. Rptr. 110 (1973); Finnegan v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 413, 290 A.2d 286
(1972).
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(3) the likelihood and probable seriousness of injury,24
(4) the obviousness of the danger,25 (5) common know-
ledge and normal public expectation of the danger (par-
ticularly for established products),26 (6) the avoidability
of injury by care in use of the product (including the effect
of instructions or warnings) ,27 and (7) the ability to elimi-
nate the danger without seriously impairing the product's
usefulness or making it unduly expensive.28
The evidence necessary to address the appropriate elements of these
criteria should be overtly advanced by both parties in a strict liability
action. 29  The conclusion on the defectiveness issue that would emerge
24. See Robbins v. Alberto Culver Co., 210 Kan. 147, 499 P.2d 1080 (1972); Berke-
bile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 219 Pa. Super. 479, 281 A.2d 707 (1971).
25. Cf. Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950) (negligence; ele-
vating this consideration into an absolute duty rule). See also Patten v. Logemann Bros.
Co., 263 Md. 364, 283 A.2d 567 (1971); Parsonson v. Construction Equip. Co., 386
Mich. 61, 191 N.W.2d 465 (1971); Bolm v. Triumph, 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769,
350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973). For cases abandoning the patent danger test but still consid-
ering the obviousness of the danger as a factor in evaluating the product under a risk-
utility theory, see Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Pike v. Frank
G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970). For interplay
between risk-utility theory and assumption of the risk as a defense, see Twerski, Old
Wine in a New Flask-Restructuring Assumption of the Risk, 60 IowA L. Rlv. 1
(1974). See also Keeton, Product Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 TExAs L.
REV. 398, 399-400 (1970).
26. See Zambrana v. Standard Oil Co., 26 Cal. App. 3d 209, 102 Cal. Rptr. 699
(1972); Cornelius v. Bay Motors, Inc., 258 Ore. 564, 484 P.2d 299 (1971).
27. See Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968); McCormack v.
Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967); Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa.
263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971).
28. Finnegan v. Havir Mfg. Co., 60 NJ. 413, 290 A.2d 286 (1972); see Horu v.
General Motors Corp., 34 Cal. App. 3d 773, 110 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1973); Rios v. Niagra
Mach. & Tool Works, 12 IlL. App. 3d 739, 299 N.E.2d 86 (1973); Coger v. Mackinaw
Prods. Co., 48 Mich. 113, 210 N.W.2d 124 (1973); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278
Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967). See also Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.,
489 F.2d 1066, 1072-73 (4th Cir. 1974) (footnotes omitted):
Price is, also, a factor to be considered, for, if a change in design would appre-
ciably add to cost, add little to safety, and take an article out of the price
range of the market to which it was intended to appeal, it may be "unreason-
able" as well as "impractical" for the Courts to require the manufacturer to
adopt such change. Of course, if an article can be made safer and the hazard
of harm may be mitigated "by an alternate design or device at no substantial
increase in price", then the manufacturer has a duty to adopt such a design
but a Cadillac may be expected to include more in the way of both conven-
iences and "crashworthiness" than the economy car.
29. The suggestion that a full exposure of risk-utility considerations occur in the
trial does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the jury should be specifically in-
structed concerning those considerations. In traditional negligence cases the court con-
siders risk-utility criteria in the first instance in deciding whether reasonable men could
differ regarding whether the defendant's conduct was substandard. See James, Functions
of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 667 (1949). When the issue is
submitted to the jury for its consideration under the "reasonable man" test, society seeks
the panel's intuitive judgment concerning the acceptability of the defendant's conduct.
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from the trier of fact as a subjective amalgam of these elements would
be the sought-for expression of societal acceptability of the product
as is or in a less dangerous form. It would give substance to the Re-
statement's necessary standard of a "defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user."
Each of the elements suggested by Dean Wade has been explicitly
expressed and considered in appellate opinions. There is no clear in-
dication, however, that the courts view the blending of all the appropri-
ate elements as the single standard for unreasonable danger. Were the
courts to move toward this perspective, the concern over both the rea-
sonable consumer and reasonable seller approaches to the unreasonable
danger standard would be substantially mitigated.
II. The Technological Expert
In products liability litigation the determination of liability begins
by focusing on some perceived deficiency in the product. The ulti-
mate resolution of the question, however, requires a much more search-
ing inquiry. Although a technically feasible alteration in a product de-
sign might have prevented injury, the product cannot be condemned
on that basis alone. The conclusion of unreasonably dangerous defect
must emerge as an amalgam of the appropriate elements of risk-utility
theory.30 The broad considerations evoked by the risk-utility approach
Since by this point the trial judge would already have determined that sufficient evidence
exists to hold the defendant liable, there is no need to set before the jury the premises
of the risk-utility theory.
Similarly, in a strict liability case premised on the concept of unreasonable danger,
the jury need not be instructed specifically on the risk-utility considerations. This fact
should have no bearing, however, on the determination of whether these criteria must
be adequately addressed throughout the trial. The decision not to instruct on risk-utility
considerations proceeds from a fear that the jury might lay aside its own intuitive judg-
ment. To insist that the trade-offs be exposed to the jury, however, amounts to a deter-
mination that a prima facie case cannot be established unless all of these considerations
are explicitly treated.
30. Risk-utility theory finds its principal application in questions of design defect.
In a true production defect situation, the plaintiff establishes that an identified produc-
tion flaw precipitated the product failure and that this failure caused the injury. Risk-
utility theory has no relevance in these situations since the product has not met the
manufacturer's own internal production standards. In those instances where the alleged
production flaws have promoted product failure after substantial use, however, the ques-
tion of defect must be framed relative to expected performance standards of the product
rather than the production standards used by the manufacturer. The focus in addressing
expected standards of performance is the reasonable expectation of the consumer, which
necessarily will reflect questions of societal significance. When risk-utility theory
emerges in this manner in an alleged production defect case, in reality a design defect
question is being approached from a different point of view.
The Cronin court abandoned the standard of "unreasonable danger" in the context
1309
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impose greater demands in terms of the identification and role of the
appropriate expert witness. Within the context of these more perva-
sive questions, then, the mechanism for selection and qualification of
the technical expert in products liability litigation must be reexam-
ined.
A. The Role of the Expert
The expert in a products liability case must address the evidenti-
ary elements necessary to establish or refute the defect and unreason-
able danger criteria and the causation issue. While a technological ex-
pert can often easily trace a product's failure or malfunction to either
manufacture or design, this alone is generally insufficient to establish
liability. Thus, in addition to more purely technical matters, both par-
ties' experts must consider the general societal values reflected in risk
and utility considerations. For example, if a production defect is al-
leged, experts -must address the following elements: (1) identification
of the flaw or flaws relative to manufacturing or physical property
standards; (2) evidence that the product's failure or malfunction is di-
rectly attributable to the flaws; (3) the relationship of the failure or
malfunction to the product's expected performance standards;"- and
(4) the causal link between the failure or malfunction and the injury.
Similarly, a design defect case would require that the experts consider:
(1) the identification of the design flaw or flaws that occasioned the
injury; (2) the enumeration of alternative design features proposed to
reduce the danger; (3) the evaluation of these features relative to the
expected performance standards of the product, as well as their effect
upon the product's subsequent usefulness and cost; (4) the compari-
of a production defect case. The allegedly defective hasp in that case could be judged
against seven other hasps in the truck that had been manufactured from clearly nonde-
fective metal. Thus, the court's failure to establish a standard for defectiveness was not
crucial to the finding of a defect in that case. The measure for defective condition was
simply the manufacturer's norm, as established by the other hasps. A strong argument
can be made for the necessity of the unreasonable danger test in production defect cases
as well. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 433-34 & n.14. The problem with the Cronin
case is that it abandoned the unreasonable danger standard (and, by implication, risk-
utility considerations) for both production and design defect cases. Absent risk-utility
criteria, there is no basis for judging the defectiveness of a design.
31. In those instances where no physical evidence exists and inferences of defect
can be drawn from the mere occurrence of the accident, plaintiff's proof need not be
as specific as outlined in the first three items. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Mo-
tors, Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298
N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973); MacDougall v. Ford Motor Co., 214 Pa. Super.
384, 257 A.2d 676 (1969).
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son of this product with other similar products; and (5) the causal
link between the design deficiency and the injury.
Because of the scope of evidentiary material implicit in these de-
lineations, a single expert may not possess the requisite expertise to
evaluate properly each element. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to
suppose that a number of individuals with distinct areas of expertise
may conjunctively address the individual evidentiary elements of proof.
However, each side must employ at least one expert who is capable of
synthesizing the diverse elements necessary to reach the ultimate legal
conclusions. Whether or not the expert is permitted to opine explicitly
on the conclusions of defect, unreasonable danger, and causation is not
critical as long as the thrust and scope of his investigation and testi-
mony reflect an understanding of the legal criteria.
Thus, an expert who is called solely to testify that a proposed de-
sign alternative would have prevented an accident is not fulfilling the
expert's critical role. Nonetheless, an examination of trial transcripts
conducted by the authors12 reveals that the posture of proof of
an unreasonably dangerous and defective condition routinely em-
ployed by experts in products litigation has been narrow in focus.
While a few courts have recognized that a risk-utility trade-off is not
merely preferable but indispensable to adjudication of the strict liabil-
ity question, 3 the common approach has 'been a tunnel-visioned ap-
praisal of a single factor, such as the availability of some alternative3 4
or the undisputed fact that the product caused the injury.35  Indeed,
the area of expertise of the person who testifies limits the range of evi-
dence that he can present and his role in the trial format. The arrival
of a safety expert in the courtroom foreshadows a statement that the
product is defective and unreasonably dangerous because it caused an
injury.36 All too often the metallurgist's presence heralds the dis-
covery of "cracks" or "porous conditions," which the jury is invited to
regard as sufficient evidence of defectiveness (with the further impli-
cation of unreasonable danger).3 7  And the too-frequent surfacing of
the ubiquitous journeyman expert who will fashion his credentials as
32. Weinstein, supra note 1.
33. See Mahoney v. Roper-Wright Mfg. Co., 490 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1973); Hoppe
v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 485 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1973); Sutkowski v. Universal
Marion Corp., 5 11. App. 3d 313, 281 N.E.2d 749 (1972).
34. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 496-505.
35. See Dowdell v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 495 F.2d 641 (6th Cir. 1974).
36. Cf. Kaczmarek v. Mesta Mach. Co., 463 F.2d 675 (3d Cir. 1972).
37. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 533-50.
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well as 'his conclusions "to fit the crime" is lamentably predictive of a
superficial conclusionY8
There is little indication that current practice permits, let alone
encourages, the selection of an expert who is capable of evaluating the
risk-utility elements that constitute factors in the unreasonably danger-
ous and defective condition test. Yet among all possible witnesses,
only the appropriate technological expert can speak to these broad
questions.
B. Identification and Qualification of the Appropriate Witness
A determination of the expertise necessary for qualification in a
given case must be based on the character of the elements of proof to
be addressed. Certain elements may be primarily quantitative in char-
acter, for example, defining a production flaw as a deviation from
manufacturing standards, or isolating the absence of a guard as a de-
sign flaw. Depending on the nature of the case, however, there may
be a progression from the more quantitative factors to those that in-
volve substantial qualitative value judgments, requiring a greater
breadth of background for the exercise of expert judgment. For ex-
ample, in judging the adequacy of a product's performance within the
context of the consumer's justified expectations of product behavior,
the expert must demonstrate a capacity to define or delineate stan-
dards of performance that may encompass subjective as well as objec-
tive judgmental criteria. The expert's evaluation of the economic and
technological trade-offs would result in such standards.8 9 This type of
expanded capability is also required of the expert in the design defect
case who will testify about the effect of proposed design alterations
on the product's usefulness and economic viability. As the qualitative
dimension of the testimony increases, there is a concomitant need for
the expert to demonstrate a more extensive educational and experien-
tial background.
Because the scope of the technological expert's testimony in ad-
38. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olsen Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433 (1972).
39. For an example of an appropriate consideration in determining standards of per-
formance, see the third issue in example 2, infra. Consideration of the expected lifetime
of a truck spring will effectively separate an alleged production defect from a design de-
fect. Thus, for the expert to reach a conclusion, he must first make tentative determina-
tions regarding the lifetime of the spring, i.e., a standard of performance for the product.
If this determination has been implicit in his conclusion, it should be explicit in his ex-
position.
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dressing the unreasonably dangerous defect question ranges from quan-
titative matters of a purely technological nature to the more qualitative
dimensions of risk and utility, the technological expert is fundamentally
distinguished from, for example, the medical expert, and thus is more
difficult to identify. This difficulty is compounded by the broad
range of expertise available in the technological area. Depending on
the issue, the appropriate expert may be selected from a range that
includes auto mechanics, mechanical engineers, bakers, and home econ-
omists. The attention devoted to the medical expert as a prototype for
establishing qualifications of experts generally arises from the wide-
spread use of medical testimony in litigation. There is, however, no
justification for utilizing criteria endemic only to the medical profes-
sion. Whether the medical expert speaks to questions of improper
treatment procedures or to questions of medical cause of the injury, his
qualitative judgments generally do not involve issues of broad societal
significance. The questions of an injured party's past trauma and
prognosis are relevant only to the specific medical case at issue, and
the expert opinion therefore is focused precisely on the variables of
the individual case. Because the medical expert's testimony is more
narrowly quantifiable than that of the technological expert, qualifica-
tions of the appropriate technological expert are less readily categor-
ized.
Rarely will there be a precise matching of the expert's prior educa-
tion and experience and the particular expertise needed in a given situ-
ation. Consequently, the expert must be capable of and indeed must
have undertaken sufficient self-education to enable him to address the
particular aspects of a given problem. The required special knowledge
would ordinarily be acquired by ad hoe education undertaken for spe-
cific litigation. Such self-education may be the essential ingredient in
establishing a given expert's qualifications to address the relevant ques-
tions.
The ca1acity for this training must be consistent with the expert's
background. In determining whether a technological witness pos-
sesses the requisite capacity for self-education, the pervasive discipline
underlying a given issue must be identified. If that discipline falls
within the witness's general qualifications, the technologist may readily
acquire the additional knowledge, data, and skill from qualified
sources. Sources available to the technologist include such materials
as drawings and specifications, methods utilized in the manufacture of
a product, and literature pertinent to the particular product and similar
products. Additionally, he would systematically observe the product
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and similar products in use and in the environment of use. To the ex-
tent necessary, he would acquire from other disciplines -the additional
information necessary to address adequately the questions of defect and
causation. If, however, in the process of seeking self-education, the
technologist discovers that the pervasive discipline involved is not
within his basic qualifications, he is obliged to defer to one more
qualified in that discipline.
The self-education requirement reveals another and perhaps more
intrinsic difference between the technological expert and the medical
expert: adaptability of expertise. For example, if an injury is associ-
ated 'with a neurological function, a physician whose principal experi-
ence has been in hematology would most likely be an inappropriate
witness. On the other hand, an engineer with experience in the electro-
mechanical machinery of steel plants may well be qualified to address
the technical aspects of a carton-stacking machine in a soft drink bot-
tling plant because the basic principles underlying electro-mechanical
machinery design inhere in both products. While the particular func-
tion of such components as shafts, bearings, gears, switches, controls,
and 'hydraulic cylinders may differ, the fundamental considerations in
the design of these elements are identical. More -fundamentally, the
principles of stress analysis, material behavior, heat transfer, fluid flow,
electricity, and thermodynamics pervade the design of all technologi-
cal devices. In contrast, the physician specializing in hematology
would not be equally capable of addressing questions associated with a
neurological injury, simply because no comparable unifying principles
have as yet been identified in the human physiology area. It is not
suggested that a hematologist could not acquire the requisite expertise in
neurological medicine, but the self-education necessary for such an un-
dertaking would not be feasible. Therefore, qualification of the medi-
cal expert must of necessity generally be defined within the context of
a narrow specialty. On the other hand, when the issue is the absence of
a guard at the point of operation in a carton-stacking machine, the ex-
pert who is familiar with steel -plant machinery (including safety fea-
tures thereof) may readily be capable of applying his expertise to a
carton-stacking machine in a bottling plant. Having established his
mastery of the underlying technological principles, the expert need
demonstrate only his acquisition of special knowledge relating to the
peculiarities of the particular product.
Thus, because of the necessarily broad scope of the technologist's
testimony and the adaptability of technological expertise (which
makes impossible a precise, readily discernible correlation between
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product type and appropriate expertise), the identification and qualifi-
cation of the technological expert presents difficulties. It is suggested,
however, that the critical determinants of the expert's qualifications
are in fact the precise technical issues in controversy in the litigation.
The appropriate medical expert can be selected with relative facility
because of the specificity with which medical issues are generally for-
mulated. If technical issues are defined with a comparable precision,
technological experts can be identified and qualified with greater cer-
titude than is presently possible. In part, the necessity for exact deline-
ation of the technical issue arises from the difficulty of assessing the
appropriateness of the broad range of skills, education, and experience
offered in support of a potential witness's qualifications. When view-
ing the qualification of the expert from the perspective of precisely
drawn technical issues, the court can more readily determine the rele-
vance of a given expertise to the particular situation. Continuing with
the illustration of the expert on steel plant machinery, in a case involv-
ing carton-stacking machines this expert need not qualify solely on the
basis of specific experience in the design of carton-stacking machines
if the issues are, for example: (1) the technical feasibility of a protec-
tive device at the machine's point of operation; (2) an evaluation of
the protective device relative to the machine's expected performance
standards; (3) the safety device's effect upon the machine's subsequent
usefulness and cost; and (4) the causal link between the design defi-
ciency and the injury. Because of the generic similarity in the consid-
erations relevant to the efficacy and feasibility of safety features, a per-
son with basic expertise in machine design may, upon demonstrating
the appropriate self-education, qualify to speak to these issues. An es-
sential element of this self-education would be familiarization with the
operation of the bottling plant and the carton-stacking machines role
within the plant. This process should include an examination of the
basis upon which the machine operators are compensated (for exam-
ple, pay-incentive plans providing a higher wage while the machine
is operating) and a determination of whether the machine is being used
as anticipated.
Although this discussion has focused on experts in design defect
cases,40 the considerations in the identification and selection of ex-
40. In a provocative article, Professor Henderson attacks the courts' ability to set
product safety standards in cases where manufacturers have in effect set standards by
making conscious design choices. Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Con-
scious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 CoLtrm. L. REv. 1532 (1973).
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perts for production defect cases are substantially analogous. Addi-
tionally, this approach to establishing qualifications recognizes the va-
riety of backgrounds, skills, and experience that potential witnesses will
offer in support of their expertise in both production and design defect
cases. Consequently, the suggested premises provide a viable basis
from which to formulate more appropriate guidelines for the selection
and qualification of the technological expert in products liability litiga-
tion. A series of examples follows to illustrate the suggested approach
to the selection of experts.
Example 1. A printer-slotter machine prints labels and cuts
and scores pieces of corrugated cardboard, which are later assembled
as boxes. There are two sets of printing rolls for two-color opera-
tions. These rolls and the knives and scores are driven by a single mo-
tor located at the feed end of the machine. The feed and exit ends of
the machine can be separated in order to change the dies, exposing
two vertical "walls" of rolls on either side of an open passageway
thirty inches wide. The machine separation mechanically disconnects
the motor from both the rolls and the knives and scores at the exit end
of the machine, but the rolls at the feed end can continue to operate.
At the time of the injury, plaintiff-employee was walking through the
open passageway to obtain a tool located on the other side of the ma-
The author divides generically dangerous products into. two classes: those that are dan-
gerous because of inadvertent design error, and those in which conscious design choice
has produced the danger. Professor Henderson contends that courts are not institution-
ally suited to establish product safety standards in cases involving the latter type of prod-
uct; such decisions are polycentric and require an understanding of trade-offs made un-
der a cost-benefit analysis. Henderson reviews a large number of appellate decisions
dealing with generically dangerous products and concludes that few courts have actually
set product safety standards in cases where it is clear that the manufacturers considered
various alternatives and rejected the safer design. The majority of cases in which courts
have set product safety standards involved inadvertent design error. In these cases
courts have found it unnecessary to formulate their own standards, Henderson concludes,
because they can rely on specific design standards set by "the collective managerial au-
thority of the engineering profession." Id. at 1550.
Professor Henderson's thesis is an engaging one. Recently several commentators
have noted the open-endedness of the design defect inquiry. See, e.g., Hoenig & Goertz,
A Rational Approach to "Crashworthy" Automobiles: The Need for Judicial Responsi-
bility, 6 Sw. U.L. Rlv. 1 (1974); Holford, supra note 14. There are, however, more
compelling reasons for the courts' failure to intrude in conscious design decisions. Sim-
ply stated, when the defendant has actually considered, weighed, and tested alternatives,
the quality of plaintiffs expert testimony is generally inferior not only in degree but in
kind to that of defendant. Plaintiff proceeds by suggesting theoretical alternatives; his
ability to test their efficacy is limited by economic realities. Plaintiff has no research
and development capabilities to match those of defendant. There is thus "no contest"
between the adversaries. If plaintiff could bring equal resources to the courtroom, ra-
tional adjudication under a cost-benefit (risk-utility) theory would be feasible.
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chine. All employees worked on a pay incentive plan that paid a
lower hourly rate during machine downtime than during production
time. Plaintiff had left the motor running so that an automatic wash-
ing attachment could clean the set of rollers at the feed end of the ma-
chine while his co-employee reset the knives and scores on the inactive
exit end of the machine. His arm caught in the rolls rotating on the
feed side of the passageway.
Plaintiff alleged as a design flaw the absence of a switch that
would automatically disconnect power to the machine motor whenever
the feed and exit ends of the machine were separated. If the jury is to
determine that this constitutes a design defect, plaintiffs expert must
address the following issues:
(1) Is such a switch technically feasible?
(2) Are there alternative design alterations, such as a guard en-
closing the rotating rolls, that could have reduced the likeli-
hood of this injury?
(3) How do all proposed alternative designs compare, relative to
the following broad questions:
(a) Is it necessary to open the machine in order to change
dies?
(b) Are there conditions -that necessitate operation of the
feed end when the machine is open?
(c) What -were the time sequences involved in setting up,
cleaning, and operating the machine within the plant's
pay incentive scheme?
(d) What would be the additional costs of each proposed al-
ternative?
(e) Could the proposed alternatives be circumvented with
: comparative ease, thus obviating their effect?
(f) Would usefulness of this machine in this plant en-
vironment be diminished by addition of the proposed
design changes?
(4) Are there other machines, performing the same or similar
functions, that utilize any of the proposed design modifica-
tions?
(5) If there are such machines, are they used in similar or dif-
ferent environments; for example, is a pay incentive plan em-
ployed?
(6) Knowing the location and direction of the rolls' rotation,
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what is the probability that the accident happened in the
manner described by the plaintiff?
The knowledge necessary to answer these questions provides a
measure of the qualifications required of those called to give expert
testimony. Ideally, the expert here would be a design engineer with
substantial experience in designing a wide range of electro-mechanical
production equipment and, in particular, prior success in designing,
manufacturing, installing, and maintaining printer-slotter machines in
all environments. Additionally, the prospective witness would have ex-
perience in production planning and scheduling and in establishing
piece-part work rates. This expertise would be the product of formal
education and practical experience in all of the areas cited.
It is highly doubtful that such a person can be found in the de-
fendant's employ, let alone in the open market of available experts.
Realistically, therefore, the appropriate expert is one who can demon-
strate competence in the design of electro-mechanical production equip-
ment (not necessarily printer-slotter machines). He must also exhibit,
through education or diversity of experience, the capacity to acquire
knowledge germane to an understanding of the -functioning of the
printer-slotter machine and its utilization within its specific environ-
ment. In addition to the more usual industrial experience, diversity of
experience can include the ability to communicate, through teaching,
both principles and practice of machine design. The expert's capacity
for self-education must include not only the ability to understand the
functioning of the particular machine, but also the ability to assess
comparative costs of alternative design modifications and the effect of
these modifications upon the machine's utility. Finally, he must
show that he has undertaken this self-education.
Example 2. A one-year-old tractor-trailer truck that had trav-
eled 90,000 miles collided with an automobile. Following a slight
impact between the truck's right front end and the car's left rear end,
the truck swerved off the right side of the road, struck an embank-
ment, and overturned. The plaintiff-truck driver reported that the
right front end of the truck "dropped down" prior to its impact with
the car. Examination of the truck following the accident revealed that
the right front leaf spring was completely broken just behind the front
shackle connection. "Gouge marks" were discovered across the sur-
face of the main leaf of the spring in the vicinity of the fracture sur-
face. Additionally, the microstructure of the steel on the fracture
faces near the leaf surface appeared to be significantly different from
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the microstructure of the remaining material in the leaf. Plaintiff
contended that these two conditions were manufacturing flaws. He al-
leged -that the gouge marks resulted from using a worn mandrel in fab-
ricating the front eye of the spring and that the aberrant microstruc-
ture near the surface resulted from improper quenching of the spring
leaf during the heat-treating operation.
Plaintiff claimed that either or both of these flaws would contrib-
ute to premature spring failure, which would cause the truck to go out
of control. Thus, 'he insisted that the spring was defective and unrea-
sonably dangerous. If these flaws are ultimately to rise to the level
of unreasonably dangerous defects, plaintiff's experts must address the
following issues:
(1) Did the gouge marks result from an aberration in the manu-
facturing process, or do these marks routinely appear in the
standard manufacturing process?
(2) Was the variation in the microstructure caused by an aberra-
tion in the quenching process, or does this variation rou-
tinely appear as a result of normal and expected decarburiza-
tion near the surface?
(3) If either or both of these conditions can be characterized as
flaws, measured by manufacturing and physical property
standards, were they the principal or most probable cause of
the spring failure, either by fatigue or single-load impact?
(4) Can the fracture of a truck spring after 90,000 miles of use
in one year be classified as premature failure?
(5) What circumstances caused the truck to go out of control?
(a) At what point in the chain of events was it most proba-
ble that the spring failed; that is, prior to impact with
the car, upon impact with the car, or as a result of im-
pact with the embankment?
(b) Could the failure of the spring prior to impact with the
embankment cause the truck to go out of control?
(c) To what extent did driver error contribute to loss of
control and the ultimate accident?
To address the first three questions, the expert must possess a
background in metallurgy with demonstrable skill in the mechanics of
failure of ferrous material. He must also exhibit an understanding,
through either experience or self-education, of the spring manufactur-
ing process, in order to diagnose whether the alleged deficiencies arose
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from the production process. A witness qualified to address the ques-
tion of premature failure, in the absence of established standards for
the lifetime of truck leaf springs, would be one who is familiar with
the historical performance of similar springs. This could be a person
who has actually been engaged in truck maintenance for a reasonable
period of time. Alternatively, such evidence could be gathered from
several sources and introduced by an expert who has the requisite ca-
pacity to comprehend the nature of the question and to interpret the
data.
The issue of causation should be addressed by a person with a
background in those aspects of mechanical engineering that would en-
able him to understand prior metallurgical testimony and integrate it
with eyewitness accounts of the truck's behavior; he should also be
able to assess the effect of spring failure on the driver's ability to con-
trol the truck. Clearly relevant to this task are an understanding of
vehicle dynamics and the ability to estimate impact and failure forces
on the truck-spring system. The prospective witness must also bring
to the role of synthesizing these diverse evidentiary elements a breadth
of experience or education sufficient to permit him to address the issues
of unreasonably dangerous defect and probable cause of the accident.
Example 3. The allegedly defective product was a baby carriage
that would fold upon manual release of a latch mechanism on one side
of the supporting structure. At the time of the injury, a child under a
babysitter's care occupied the carriage. The babysitter was seated next
to the carriage, rolling it back and forth, with her foot resting on one of
the carriage wheels. Her foot inadvertently engaged the latch mechan-
ism, causing it to release. The carriage collapsed, injuring the child.
Plaintiff alleged that the latch was improperly designed. If the
jury is to find the latch defective, plaintiff's expert must address the
following issues:
(1) What are the basic considerations in the design of this type
of latch mechanism, with particular reference to the follow-
ing:
(a) location;
(b) the direction and magnitude of the force necessary to
activate;
(c) the trade-offs between complexity, redundancy, and ease
of use, and safety;
(d) the effectiveness of a possible guard around the latch
mechanism?
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(2) Within design constraints, are there any alternative designs
that would be less dangerous than the one in question?
(3) What effect would those alternative designs have upon the
cost and utility of the baby carriage?
(4) Are there baby carriages marketed with features similar to
the proposed alternative designs?
(5) If one of the proposed design alternatives had been incorpor-
ated in the carriage, would the injury have been prevented?
The general background required of an expert in this case would
include knowledge of the geometry of linkages and the capacity to cal-
culate the forces that would be applied to the linkages from external
loading. These skills are necessary in order to design such diverse
products as typewriters, card tables, automobile hood release mechan-
isms, and the Apollo rocket docking mechanism. Those whose know-
ledge is based on devices other than the carriage release latch can ap-
ply it to the latch problem only after undertaking a regimen of self-ed-
ucation.
The requisite self-education would entail review of alternative link-
age and latch designs, as described in patent literature as well as open
literature. Calculation of all forces that realistically could have been
applied to the latch mechanism is also required. Within the context of
these additional studies, the expert must acquire a reasonable capacity
to assess the trade-offs among complexity of design, ease of use, and
cost increment.
Example 4. A child's toy, used exclusively for indoor play, con-
tained a glass surface measuring over thirty-six square inches. While
playing with this toy, the child stumbled and fell on the glass surface,
breaking it and injuring his arm near his elbow.
If it is reasonably foreseeable that a child within the class of an-
ticipated users would carry the toy around without recognizing or
guarding against the danger that it poses if he should trip and fall, the
product's standard of performance should be one that avoids an un-
reasonable danger to the child-user who merely acts as expected.
Thus, the principal issue at trial would be the reasonably expected
standard of performance of a piece of glass on the surface of a child's
toy. The expert would then have to address the following:
(1) What is the reasonable limit of impact loads that the material
used for the toy's surface should withstand when the toy is
dropped?
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(2) What is the reasonable limit of impact loads that the material
should withstand upon contact with a child's body?
(3) If standards for performance of glass under these conditions
exist, are they consistent with the standards established in
(1) and (2)?
(4) Does the present design of the glass surface generally fall
within the performance parameters indicated either in (1)
and (2) orin (3)?
(5) If the data found in (1) and (2) are offered as the requisite
standard, can the design parameters of the glass be adjusted
to meet the suggested level of performance?
(6) Is there any material that could be substituted for the glass
that would meet the impact-load criteria as well or better?
(7) What would be the cost and utility effects of constructing the
toy from a material, either glass or a substitute, that meets
the expected impact-load standard of performance?
The general background of the appropriate expert in this case
would include experience in the behavior of materials under a variety
of loading conditions. He must demonstrate knowledge of the manner
in which loads and forces would be transmitted to the glass. Addi-
tionally, he must exhibit the capacity to devise, implement, and inter-
pret reasonable experiments to adduce the impact-load capacity of var-
ious materials.
The self-education required in this instance could be extensive.
Absent any standard test procedures or standards for the impact load
that glass should absorb 'before fracture, the expert would have to se-
lect a procedure that would simulate the reasonably foreseeable occur-
rence: a child carrying the toy, falling, and striking his elbow on the
glass surface. The expert should demonstrate that there is sufficient
weight and dimension data on children with which to calculate the
force of a falling child and that this could be simulated in a drop test.
Additionally, he would indicate the method used to simulate the padding
effect of the flesh over a child's bone.
In establishing the scope of his self-education, founded upon a
general knowledge of the underlying scientific principles, the expert
not only demonstrates his ability to address the specific technical issues,
but demonstrates as well his capacity .to describe expected standards of
product performance. Also required, however, is an expertise suit-
able to confront the issues of ultimate cost, based upon the design
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changes necessary to meet the proposed performance standards. While
this expertise could be furnished by the same person, the background
necessary to address these questions would include general experience
in the design and production of consumer goods, which may require
obtaining the services of a second expert.
Example 5, The carrier over the rear fender of a single-seat mo-
torcycle is used to hold packages being transported by the driver. It is
fastened to the motorcycle by means of a metal bracket. While riding
a motorcycle with a load securely fastened to the carrier, the plaintiff
was forced off the road, and the cycle collided with a tree. Because
of the failure of the attaching bracket, the impact caused the carrier to
break loose; the loaded carrier struck the driver in the back, increas-
ing the severity of his injuries.
Preliminary examination of the supporting bracket revealed ap-
parently extreme porosity within the structure of the metal at the frac-
ture surface. Plaintiff suggested that this flawed condition caused the
bracket to break upon the motorcycle's impact. This contention raises
the issue of "crashworthiness," or the appropriate standards of per-
formance for the carrier bracket. The points at issue may be deline-
ated as follows:
(1) Did the observed porosity weaken the metal to a degree sig-
nificant enough to cause the bracket's failure?
(2) Is the observed porosity a true flaw or inherent in the nature
of that particular material?
(3) Regardless of whether the porosity was a flaw, should the
bracket be expected to withstand the conditions of the acci-
dent?
(4) Was the package load supported by the carrier, which was at-
tached to the bracket, within the anticipated range of load-
ings?
(5) If the material used in the bracket was not flawed, could
the -bracket failure have been prevented by a design altera-
tion in either structure or material?
(6) If bracket failure could have been prevented only by rede-
sign, what would be the alteration's effect upon the bracket's
subsequent usefulness and cost?
While it is obvious that a person with a background in metallurgy
is needed to answer the first two questions, the methods by which he
proposes to elicit the necessary data are essential elements in establish-
ing his qualifications. Subjective observations of the metallic surface
1323
Vol. 52:1303, 1974
are insufficient. They must be supported by other indicia, such as ex-
amination of similar parts constructed out of the same material. Un-
less it is obvious and generally uncontroverted that porosity weakens
the material, experimental testing would be needed to establish the ef-
fect of porosity on the material's strength or impact resistance.
To address the questions on the effect of redesigning the bracket,
the witness should demonstrate a background in machine member de-
sign, though not necessarily carrier bracket design. This would re-
quire the ability to estimate dynamic loadings and an understanding of
the response of materials to those loadings. The witness must also ex-
hibit the capacity to make reasonable judgments concerning the incre-
mental cost changes and to assess the effect on the vehicle's utility.
Possibly no single expert can address both the basic metallurgical ques-
tions and the design questions; thus, two experts would be required.
One of them, probably the latter, would address the aspects of crash-
worthiness, elicited in the third and fourth questions, as elements of the
product's expected standard of performance.
It is not suggested that any expert can bring to these matters quali-
fications that give him a greater intrinsic ability to answer questions of
ultimate social significance than are brought by the jurors who must
ultimately answer them. Nonetheless, the expert should state for the
jury's benefit his appraisal of whether the bracket should be expected
to withstand this and similar accident conditions, given the frequency
of vehicular collision. This exercise is not designed to intrude upon
the factfinding function of the jury, but rather to place the expert's
technological evidence within a context appropriate to a determina-
tion of the presence or absence of an unreasonably dangerous and de-
fective condition in the product. While there may not be requisite
qualifications for considering the social dimension of expected perform-
ance standards, only the expert qualified to address the related issues
of the product's economic viability and usefulness should be permit-
ted to provide the context testimony of standards of performance.
IlI. Conclusion
The purpose of qualifying a witness as a technological expert is to
demonstrate his capacity to address subject matter beyond the ordinary
experience of the layman, whether judge or juror. The ultimate objec-
tive of his testimony is to raise the level of comprehension of remotely
perceived technological material. The problems involved in qualifying
the witness to give expert testimony arise both from the scope of evi-
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dentiary material that may have to be addressed and the diverse range
of technological skills offered by potential witnesses.
An attempt to formulate a rule that addresses the multi-faceted
complexities of qualification of the expert witness is found in rule 702
of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: "If scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."41  This pro-
posed rule recognizes the broad scope of evidentiary material and the
diversity of technological skills that may be involved, but in so doing
provides minimal assistance to the court in the exercise of its discretion-
ary power to pass on a witness's qualification.
It is not feasible to formulate a single rule that is at once suffi-
ciently broad and adequately precise to afford any meaningful assist-
ance to the trial court. Instead, we have enunciated what we consider
to be the basic premise for qualification of the technological witness:
the precise delineation of the technical issues must provide the focus
for the evaluation of the expert's credentials. The parties, counsel, and
prospective witnesses will identify the technical issues before the court,
perhaps most appropriately at a pretrial hearing, as the initial step in
the qualification procedure. Thereupon the witnesses must demonstrate
that their education, background, and skills, together with the necessary
self-education, would permit them to couple their basic expertise with
those technical questions at issue. This task is not an easy one. The
court must apply a three-stage qualification procedure to the prospec-
tive expert witness. Initially, the court must be satisfied that the per-
vasive discipline, as identified by a given issue, is within the scope of
the witness's background skills. Then the prospective witness must
persuade the court that the self-education that he has undertaken in-
volves a legitimate application of his basic skills. Finally, the witness
must demonstrate that he has been sufficiently thorough in acquiring
this self-education to achieve a level of qualification consistent with the
technical issues that he will address. The court may, at any stage, find
the expert's qualifications inadequate and may either limit the scope of
his testimony or reject him as an inappropriate witness.
41. PROPOSED FED. R. Evm. 702 (1973). For a detailed treatment of the effect of
the proposed rules on products liability litigation, see Mitchell, The Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence: How They Affect Product Liability Practice, 12 DUQ. L. REV. 551
(1974).
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Some observations on the present state of the art of qualifying an
expert are appropriate at this point. There is no question that the pres-
ent emphasis is almost exclusively on examining paper credentials and
relating those credentials to the specific product at issue. This prac-
tice fails to fulfill the desiderata of even the first stated criterion. The
witness's capacity to undertake self-education and the extent to which
he has actually done so receive almost -no attention. Indeed, to the ex-
tent that the expert's self-education for particular litigation is intro-
duced at all, it is used in a perverse manner, becoming primarily a
weapon with which to discredit the expertise of the witness rather than
a means for qualifying him. When a potential witness admits that he
has undertaken special study in order to testify in specific litigation, he
becomes fair prey -for derisive cross-examination, during which the per-
vasiveness of his self-education is dwarfed by his admitted lack of pre-
vious experience. It is difficult to understand the enhanced credibility
of experience gathered at some remote period in time. In light of to-
day's rapidly evolving technology, the inverse relationship of credible
experience to passage of time involves contorted logic.
As a practical matter, the brunt of this phenomenon is borne by
plaintiff's witness. It is common knowledge that there is no open mar-
ket for experts with experience in specific products. They are, by and
large, in the employ of institutional defendants, if they exist at all.
Plaintiffs are thus forced to seek out generalists such as consulting en-
gineers, academicians, and technicians, whose only hope for qualifica-
tion turns on this process of self-education for a particular case. To
require expert testimony in order to establish a prima facie case, while
at the same time permitting an attack on the witness's credibility
by belittling the only method by which he can become a witness, imposes
a -tremendous burden on the plaintiff. There may be valid reasons to
distinguish between seasoned experience and recently acquired under-
standing, but courts should permit this question to be raised only if de-
manded by the scope of the technological issue. In short, it is time
for courts to recognize the realities of technological expertise and insist
that the capability for and acquisition of self-education be demon-
strated. Once self-education has been recognized as a legitimate basis
for expert qualification, the courts have a duty to prevent its debase-
ment by reckless cross-examination.
While no explicit criteria may be adduced for the suggested quali-
fication procedures, incisive voir dire predicated upon the suggested
framework should afford the court adequate bases for an informed
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judgment. This procedure can be more advantageously pursued in
the pretrial period.
In some instances, the technical issues may be of such complexity,
or the range of qualifications offered by potential witnesses so diverse,
that the court may find it advantageous to enlist the aid of independ-
ent technical consultants. Those consultants could guide the court in
isolating the relevant technical issues and in recognizing the general
background needed to address the issues. The ultimate responsibility
for judging the propriety of a witness's qualification will of course re-
main with the trial judge.
The very nature of the problem of qualifying potential witnesses
as experts precludes a precise quantitative formulation that would per-
mit routine application of a formal check list to the great variety of
technological issues and witness credentials. A basic premise for quali-
fication of the witness has been presented, coupled with a suggested
mechanism for providing the appropriate -focus -for the precisely de-
fined technological issues. Together, they provide a viable basis for
the selection and qualification of technological experts in products lia-
bility litigation.
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